HTTP Working Group                                              R. Polli
Internet-Draft                         Team Digitale, Italian Government
Obsoletes: 3230 (if approved)                                  L. Pardue
Intended status: Standards Track                              Cloudflare
Expires: November 26, 2022                                  May 25, 2022
                             Digest Fields
                  draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-09
Abstract
   This document defines HTTP fields that support integrity digests.
   The Content-Digest field can be used for the integrity of HTTP
   message content.  The Repr-Digest field can be used for the integrity
   of HTTP representations.  Want-Content-Digest and Want-Repr-Digest
   can be used to indicate a sender's interest and preferences for
   receiving the respective Integrity fields.
   This document obsoletes RFC 3230 and the Digest and Want-Digest HTTP
   fields.
About This Document
   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
   Status information for this document may be found at
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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Table of Contents
   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Document Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Concept Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.3.  Obsoleting RFC 3230 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.4.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.  The Content-Digest Field  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  The Repr-Digest Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.1.  Using Repr-Digest in State-Changing Requests  . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Repr-Digest and Content-Location in Responses . . . . . .  10
   4.  Integrity preference fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields Registry . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.1.  HTTP Messages Are Not Protected In Full . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.2.  End-to-End Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.3.  Usage in Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.4.  Usage in Trailer Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.5.  Usage with Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.6.  Algorithm Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.7.  Resource exhaustion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.1.  HTTP Field Name Registration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.2.  Establish the Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields
           Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
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     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     8.3.  URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   Appendix A.  Resource Representation and Representation Data  . .  19
   Appendix B.  Examples of Unsolicited Digest . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     B.1.  Server Returns Full Representation Data . . . . . . . . .  21
     B.2.  Server Returns No Representation Data . . . . . . . . . .  22
     B.3.  Server Returns Partial Representation Data  . . . . . . .  22
     B.4.  Client and Server Provide Full Representation Data  . . .  23
     B.5.  Client Provides Full Representation Data, Server Provides
           No Representation Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     B.6.  Client and Server Provide Full Representation Data  . . .  25
     B.7.  POST Response does not Reference the Request URI  . . . .  25
     B.8.  POST Response Describes the Request Status  . . . . . . .  26
     B.9.  Digest with PATCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     B.10. Error responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     B.11. Use with Trailer Fields and Transfer Coding . . . . . . .  29
   Appendix C.  Examples of Want-Repr-Digest Solicited Digest  . . .  29
     C.1.  Server Selects Client's Least Preferred Algorithm . . . .  30
     C.2.  Server Selects Algorithm Unsupported by Client  . . . . .  30
     C.3.  Server Does Not Support Client Algorithm and Returns an
           Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
   Appendix D.  Migrating from RFC 3230  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
   Code Samples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
   Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     G.1.  Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-08  . . . . . . .  34
     G.2.  Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-07  . . . . . . .  34
     G.3.  Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-06  . . . . . . .  34
     G.4.  Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-05  . . . . . . .  34
     G.5.  Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-04  . . . . . . .  34
     G.6.  Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-03  . . . . . . .  35
     G.7.  Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-02  . . . . . . .  35
     G.8.  Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-01  . . . . . . .  35
     G.9.  Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-00  . . . . . . .  35
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
1.  Introduction
   HTTP does not define the means to protect the data integrity of
   content or representations.  When HTTP messages are transferred
   between endpoints, lower layer features or properties such as TCP
   checksums or TLS records [RFC2818] can provide some integrity
   protection.  However, transport-oriented integrity provides a limited
   utility because it is opaque to the application layer and only covers
   the extent of a single connection.  HTTP messages often travel over a
   chain of separate connections, in between connections there is a
   possibility for unintended or malicious data corruption.  An HTTP
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   integrity mechanism can provide the means for endpoints, or
   applications using HTTP, to detect data corruption and make a choice
   about how to act on it.  An example use case is to aid fault
   detection and diagnosis across system boundaries.
   This document defines two digest integrity mechanisms for HTTP.
   First, content integrity, which acts on conveyed content (Section 6.4
   of [SEMANTICS]).  Second, representation data integrity, which acts
   on representation data (Section 3.2 of [SEMANTICS]).  This supports
   advanced use cases such as validating the integrity of a resource
   that was reconstructed from parts retrieved using multiple requests
   or connections.
   This document obsoletes RFC 3230 and therefore the Digest and Want-
   Digest HTTP fields; see Section 1.3.
1.1.  Document Structure
   This document is structured as follows:
   o  Section 2 defines the Content-Digest request and response header
      and trailer field,
   o  Section 3 defines the Repr-Digest request and response header and
      trailer field,
   o  Section 4 defines the Want-Repr-Digest and Want-Content-Digest
      request and response header and trailer field,
   o  Section 5 describes algorithms and their relation to the fields
      defined in this document,
   o  Section 3.1 details computing representation digests,
   o  Appendix B and Appendix C provide examples of using Repr-Digest
      and Want-Repr-Digest.
1.2.  Concept Overview
   The HTTP fields defined in this document can be used for HTTP
   integrity.  Senders choose a hashing algorithm and calculate a digest
   from an input related to the HTTP message, the algorithm identifier
   and digest are transmitted in an HTTP field.  Receivers can validate
   the digest for integrity purposes.  Hashing algorithms are registered
   in the "Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields" (see Section 5).
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   Selecting the data on which digests are calculated depends on the use
   case of HTTP messages.  This document provides different headers for
   HTTP representation data and HTTP content.
   There are use-cases where a simple digest of the HTTP content bytes
   is required.  The "Content-Digest" request and response header and
   trailer field is defined to support digests of content (Section 3.2
   of [SEMANTICS]); see Section 2.
   For more advanced use-cases, the "Repr-Digest" request and response
   header and trailer field (Section 3) is defined.  It contains a
   digest value computed by applying a hashing algorithm to selected
   representation data (Section 3.2 of [SEMANTICS]).  Basing "Repr-
   Digest" on the selected representation makes it straightforward to
   apply it to use-cases where the transferred data requires some sort
   of manipulation to be considered a representation or conveys a
   partial representation of a resource, such as Range Requests (see
   Section 14.2 of [SEMANTICS]).
   "Content-Digest" and "Repr-Digest" support hashing algorithm agility.
   The "Want-Content-Digest" and "Want-Repr-Digest" fields allow
   endpoints to express interest in "Content-Digest" and "Repr-Digest"
   respectively, and preference of algorithms in either.
   "Content-Digest" and "Repr-Digest" are collectively termed Integrity
   fields.  "Want-Content-Digest" and "Want-Repr-Digest" are
   collectively termed Integrity preference fields.
   Integrity fields are tied to the "Content-Encoding" and "Content-
   Type" header fields.  Therefore, a given resource may have multiple
   different digest values when transferred with HTTP.
   Integrity fields do not provide integrity for HTTP messages or
   fields.  However, they can be combined with other mechanisms that
   protect metadata, such as digital signatures, in order to protect the
   phases of an HTTP exchange in whole or in part.  For example, HTTP
   Message Signatures [SIGNATURES] could be used to sign Integrity
   fields, thus providing coverage for HTTP content or representation
   data.
   This specification does not define means for authentication,
   authorization or privacy.
1.3.  Obsoleting RFC 3230
   [RFC3230] defined the "Digest" and "Want-Digest" HTTP fields for HTTP
   integrity.  It also coined the term "instance" and "instance
   manipulation" in order to explain concepts that are now more
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   universally defined, and implemented, as HTTP semantics such as
   selected representation data (Section 3.2 of [SEMANTICS]).
   Experience has shown that implementations of [RFC3230] have
   interpreted the meaning of "instance" inconsistently, leading to
   interoperability issues.  The most common mistake being the
   calculation of the digest using (what we now call) message content,
   rather than using (what we now call) representation data as was
   originally intended.  Interestingly, time has also shown that a
   digest of message content can be beneficial for some use cases.  So
   it is difficult to detect if non-conformance to [RFC3230] is
   intentional or unintentional.
   In order to address potential inconsistencies and ambiguity across
   implementations of "Digest" and "Want-Digest", this document
   obsoletes [RFC3230].  The Integrity fields (Section 3 and Section 2)
   and Integrity preference fields (Section 4) defined in this document
   are better aligned with current HTTP semantics and have names that
   more clearly articulate the intended usages.
1.4.  Notational Conventions
   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.
   This document uses the Augmented BNF defined in [RFC5234] and updated
   by [RFC7405].
   This document uses the following terminology from Section 3 of
   [STRUCTURED-FIELDS] to specify syntax and parsing: Boolean, Byte
   Sequence, Dictionary, Integer, and List.
   The definitions "representation", "selected representation",
   "representation data", "representation metadata", "user agent" and
   "content" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [SEMANTICS].
   Hashing algorithm names respect the casing used in their definition
   document (e.g. SHA-1, CRC32c) whereas hashing algorithm keys are
   quoted (e.g. "sha", "crc32c").
   The term "checksum" describes the output of the application of an
   algorithm to a sequence of bytes, whereas "digest" is only used in
   relation to the value contained in the fields.
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   Integrity fields: collective term for "Content-Digest" and "Repr-
   Digest"
   Integrity preference fields: collective term for "Want-Repr-Digest"
   and "Want-Content-Digest"
2.  The Content-Digest Field
   The "Content-Digest" HTTP field can be used in requests and responses
   to communicate digests that are calculated using a hashing algorithm
   applied to the actual message content (see Section 6.4 of
   [SEMANTICS]).  It is a "Dictionary" (see Section 3.2 of
   [STRUCTURED-FIELDS]) where each:
   o  key conveys the hashing algorithm (see Section 5) used to compute
      the digest;
   o  value is a "Byte Sequence" (Section 3.3.5 of [STRUCTURED-FIELDS]),
      that contains the output of the digest calculation.
   For example:
   NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792
   Content-Digest: \
     sha-512=:WZDPaVn/7XgHaAy8pmojAkGWoRx2UFChF41A2svX+TaPm+AbwAgBWnrI\
     iYllu7BNNyealdVLvRwEmTHWXvJwew==:
   The "Dictionary" type can be used, for example, to attach multiple
   digests calculated using different hashing algorithms in order to
   support a population of endpoints with different or evolving
   capabilities.  Such an approach could support transitions away from
   weaker algorithms (see Section 6.6).
   NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792
   Repr-Digest: \
     sha-256=:4REjxQ4yrqUVicfSKYNO/cF9zNj5ANbzgDZt3/h3Qxo=:,\
     sha-512=:WZDPaVn/7XgHaAy8pmojAkGWoRx2UFChF41A2svX+TaPm+AbwAgBWnrI\
     iYllu7BNNyealdVLvRwEmTHWXvJwew==:
   A recipient MAY ignore any or all digests.  This allows the recipient
   to choose which hashing algorithm(s) to use for validation instead of
   verifying every digest.
   A sender MAY send a digest without knowing whether the recipient
   supports a given hashing algorithm, or even knowing that the
   recipient will ignore it.
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   "Content-Digest" can be sent in a trailer section.  In this case,
   "Content-Digest" MAY be merged into the header section; see
   Section 6.5.1 of [SEMANTICS].
3.  The Repr-Digest Field
   The "Repr-Digest" HTTP field can be used in requests and responses to
   communicate digests that are calculated using a hashing algorithm
   applied to the entire selected representation data (see Section 8.1
   of [SEMANTICS]).
   Representations take into account the effect of the HTTP semantics on
   messages.  For example, the content can be affected by Range Requests
   or methods such as HEAD, while the way the content is transferred "on
   the wire" is dependent on other transformations (e.g. transfer
   codings for HTTP/1.1 - see Section 6.1 of [HTTP11]).  To help
   illustrate HTTP representation concepts, several examples are
   provided in Appendix A.
   When a message has no representation data it is still possible to
   assert that no representation data was sent by computing the digest
   on an empty string (see Section 6.3).
   "Repr-Digest" is a "Dictionary" (see Section 3.2 of
   [STRUCTURED-FIELDS]) where each:
   o  key conveys the hashing algorithm (see Section 5) used to compute
      the digest;
   o  value is a "Byte Sequence" that contains the output of the digest
      calculation.
   For example:
   NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792
   Repr-Digest: \
     sha-512=:WZDPaVn/7XgHaAy8pmojAkGWoRx2UFChF41A2svX+TaPm+AbwAgBWnrI\
     iYllu7BNNyealdVLvRwEmTHWXvJwew==:
   The "Dictionary" type can be used, for example, to attach multiple
   digests calculated using different hashing algorithms in order to
   support a population of endpoints with different or evolving
   capabilities.  Such an approach could support transitions away from
   weaker algorithms (see Section 6.6).
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   NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792
   Repr-Digest: \
     sha-256=:4REjxQ4yrqUVicfSKYNO/cF9zNj5ANbzgDZt3/h3Qxo=:,\
     sha-512=:WZDPaVn/7XgHaAy8pmojAkGWoRx2UFChF41A2svX+TaPm+AbwAgBWnrI\
     iYllu7BNNyealdVLvRwEmTHWXvJwew==:
   A recipient MAY ignore any or all digests.  This allows the recipient
   to choose which hashing algorithm(s) to use for validation instead of
   verifying every digest.
   A sender MAY send a digest without knowing whether the recipient
   supports a given hashing algorithm, or even knowing that the
   recipient will ignore it.
   "Repr-Digest" can be sent in a trailer section.  In this case, "Repr-
   Digest" MAY be merged into the header section; see Section 6.5.1 of
   [SEMANTICS].
3.1.  Using Repr-Digest in State-Changing Requests
   When the representation enclosed in a state-changing request does not
   describe the target resource, the representation digest MUST be
   computed on the representation data.  This is the only possible
   choice because representation digest requires complete representation
   metadata (see Section 3).
   In responses,
   o  if the representation describes the status of the request, "Repr-
      Digest" MUST be computed on the enclosed representation (see
      Appendix B.8 );
   o  if there is a referenced resource "Repr-Digest" MUST be computed
      on the selected representation of the referenced resource even if
      that is different from the target resource.  That might or might
      not result in computing "Repr-Digest" on the enclosed
      representation.
   The latter case is done according to the HTTP semantics of the given
   method, for example using the "Content-Location" header field (see
   Section 8.7 of [SEMANTICS]).  In contrast, the "Location" header
   field does not affect "Repr-Digest" because it is not representation
   metadata.
   For example, in "PATCH" requests, the representation digest will be
   computed on the patch document because the representation metadata
   refers to the patch document and not to the target resource (see
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   Section 2 of [PATCH]).  In responses, instead, the representation
   digest will be computed on the selected representation of the patched
   resource.
3.2.  Repr-Digest and Content-Location in Responses
   When a state-changing method returns the "Content-Location" header
   field, the enclosed representation refers to the resource identified
   by its value and "Repr-Digest" is computed accordingly.  An example
   is given in Appendix B.7.
4.  Integrity preference fields
   Senders can indicate their interest in Integrity fields and hashing
   algorithm preferences using the "Want-Content-Digest" or "Want-Repr-
   Digest" fields.  These can be used in both requests and responses.
   "Want-Content-Digest" indicates that the sender would like to receive
   a content digest on messages associated with the request URI and
   representation metadata, using the "Content-Digest" field.
   "Want-Repr-Digest" indicates that the sender would like to receive a
   representation digest on messages associated with the request URI and
   representation metadata, using the "Repr-Digest" field.
   If "Want-Content-Digest" or "Want-Repr-Digest" are used in a
   response, it indicates that the server would like the client to
   provide the respective Integrity field on future requests.
   "Want-Content-Digest" and "Want-Repr-Digest" are of type "Dictionary"
   where each:
   o  key conveys the hashing algorithm (see Section 5);
   o  value is an "Integer" (Section 3.3.1 of [STRUCTURED-FIELDS]) that
      conveys an ascending, relative, weighted preference.  It must be
      in the range 0 to 10 inclusive.  1 is the least preferred, 10 is
      the most preferred, and a value of 0 means "not acceptable".
   Examples:
   Want-Repr-Digest: sha-256=1
   Want-Repr-Digest: sha-512=3, sha-256=10, unixsum=0
   Want-Content-Digest: sha-256=1
   Want-Content-Digest: sha-512=3, sha-256=10, unixsum=0
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5.  Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields Registry
   The "Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields", maintained by IANA at
   https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-dig-alg/ [1], registers
   algorithms for use with the Integrity and Integrity preference fields
   defined in this document.
   This registry uses the Specification Required policy (Section 4.6 of
   [RFC8126]).
   Registrations MUST include the following fields:
   o  Algorithm Key: the Structured Fields key value used in "Content-
      Digest", "Repr-Digest", "Want-Content-Digest", or "Want-Repr-
      Digest" field Dictionary member keys
   o  Status: the status of the algorithm.  Use "standard" for
      standardized algorithms without known problems; "experimental" or
      some other appropriate value
      *  e.g. according to the type and status of the primary document
         in which the algorithm is defined; "insecure" when the
         algorithm is insecure; "reserved" when the algorithm references
         a reserved token value
   o  Description: a short description of the algorithm
   o  Reference(s): a set of pointers to the primary documents defining
      the algorithm and key
   Insecure hashing algorithms MAY be used to preserve integrity against
   corruption, but MUST NOT be used in a potentially adversarial
   setting; for example, when signing Integrity fields' values for
   authenticity.
   The entries in Table 1 are registered by this document.
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   +-----------+----------+--------------------------+-----------------+
   | Algorithm | Status   | Description              | Reference(s)    |
   | Key       |          |                          |                 |
   +-----------+----------+--------------------------+-----------------+
   | sha-512   | standard | The SHA-512 algorithm.   | [RFC6234],      |
   |           |          |                          | [RFC4648], this |
   |           |          |                          | document.       |
   | sha-256   | standard | The SHA-256 algorithm.   | [RFC6234],      |
   |           |          |                          | [RFC4648], this |
   |           |          |                          | document.       |
   | md5       | insecure | The MD5 algorithm. It is | [RFC1321],      |
   |           |          | vulnerable to collision  | [RFC4648], this |
   |           |          | attacks; see [NO-MD5]    | document.       |
   |           |          | and [CMU-836068]         |                 |
   | sha       | insecure | The SHA-1 algorithm. It  | [RFC3174],      |
   |           |          | is vulnerable to         | [RFC4648],      |
   |           |          | collision attacks; see   | [RFC6234] this  |
   |           |          | [NO-SHA] and             | document.       |
   |           |          | [IACR-2020-014]          |                 |
   | unixsum   | insecure | The algorithm used by    | [RFC4648],      |
   |           |          | the UNIX "sum" command.  | [RFC6234],      |
   |           |          |                          | [UNIX], this    |
   |           |          |                          | document.       |
   | unixcksum | insecure | The algorithm used by    | [RFC4648],      |
   |           |          | the UNIX "cksum"         | [RFC6234],      |
   |           |          | command.                 | [UNIX], this    |
   |           |          |                          | document.       |
   | adler     | insecure | The ADLER32 algorithm.   | [RFC1950], this |
   |           |          |                          | document.       |
   | crc32c    | insecure | The CRC32c algorithm.    | [RFC4960]       |
   |           |          |                          | appendix B,     |
   |           |          |                          | this document.  |
   +-----------+----------+--------------------------+-----------------+
                     Table 1: Initial Hash Algorithms
6.  Security Considerations
6.1.  HTTP Messages Are Not Protected In Full
   This document specifies a data integrity mechanism that protects HTTP
   representation data or content, but not HTTP header and trailer
   fields, from certain kinds of corruption.
   Integrity fields are not intended to be a general protection against
   malicious tampering with HTTP messages.  This can be achieved by
   combining it with other approaches such as transport-layer security
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   or digital signatures (for example, HTTP Message Signatures
   [SIGNATURES]).
6.2.  End-to-End Integrity
   Integrity fields can help detect representation data or content
   modification due to implementation errors, undesired "transforming
   proxies" (see Section 7.7 of [SEMANTICS]) or other actions as the
   data passes across multiple hops or system boundaries.  Even a simple
   mechanism for end-to-end representation data integrity is valuable
   because a user agent can validate that resource retrieval succeeded
   before handing off to a HTML parser, video player etc. for parsing.
   Note that using these mechanisms alone does not provide end-to-end
   integrity of HTTP messages over multiple hops, since metadata could
   be manipulated at any stage.  Methods to protect metadata are
   discussed in Section 6.3.
6.3.  Usage in Signatures
   Digital signatures are widely used together with checksums to provide
   the certain identification of the origin of a message [NIST800-32].
   Such signatures can protect one or more HTTP fields and there are
   additional considerations when Integrity fields are included in this
   set.
   There are no restrictions placed on the type or format of digitial
   signature that Integrity fields can be used with.  One possible
   approach is to combine them with HTTP Message Signatures
   [SIGNATURES].
   Digests explicitly depend on the "representation metadata" (e.g. the
   values of "Content-Type", "Content-Encoding" etc).  A signature that
   protects Integrity fields but not other "representation metadata" can
   expose the communication to tampering.  For example, an actor could
   manipulate the "Content-Type" field-value and cause a digest
   validation failure at the recipient, preventing the application from
   accessing the representation.  Such an attack consumes the resources
   of both endpoints.  See also Section 3.2.
   Signatures are likely to be deemed an adversarial setting when
   applying Integrity fields; see Section 5.  Using signatures to
   protect the checksum of an empty representation allows receiving
   endpoints to detect if an eventual payload has been stripped or
   added.
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   Any mangling of Integrity fields, including digests' de-duplication
   or combining different field values (see Section 5.2 of [SEMANTICS])
   might affect signature validation.
6.4.  Usage in Trailer Fields
   Before sending Integrity fields in a trailer section, the sender
   should consider that intermediaries are explicitly allowed to drop
   any trailer (see Section 6.5.2 of [SEMANTICS]).
   When Integrity fields are used in a trailer section, the field-values
   are received after the content.  Eager processing of content before
   the trailer section prevents digest validation, possibly leading to
   processing of invalid data.
   Not every hashing algorithm is suitable for use in the trailer
   section, some may require to pre-process the whole payload before
   sending a message (e.g. see [I-D.thomson-http-mice]).
6.5.  Usage with Encryption
   The checksum of an encrypted payload can change between different
   messages depending on the encryption algorithm used; in those cases
   its value could not be used to provide a proof of integrity "at rest"
   unless the whole (e.g. encoded) content is persisted.
6.6.  Algorithm Agility
   The security properties of hashing algorithms are not fixed.
   Algorithm Agility (see [RFC7696]) is achieved by providing
   implementations with flexibility to choose hashing algorithms from
   the IANA Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields registry; see
   Section 7.2.
   The "standard" algorithms listed in this document are suitable for
   many purposes, including adversarial situations where hash functions
   might need to provide resistance to collision, first-preimage and
   second-preimage attacks.  Algorithms listed as "insecure" either
   provide none of these properties, or are known to be weak (see
   [NO-MD5] and [NO-SHA]).
   For adversarial situations, which of the "standard" algorithms are
   acceptable will depend on the level of protection the circumstances
   demand.  As there is no negotiation, endpoints that depend on a
   digest for security will be vulnerable to attacks on the weakest
   algorithm they are willing to accept.
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   Transition from weak algorithms is supported by negotiation of
   hashing algorithm using "Want-Content-Digest" or "Want-Repr-Digest"
   (see Section 4) or by sending multiple digests from which the
   receiver chooses.  Endpoints are advised that sending multiple values
   consumes resources, which may be wasted if the receiver ignores them
   (see Section 3).
   While algorithm agility allows the migration to stronger algorithms
   it does not prevent the use of weaker algorithms.  Integrity fields
   do not provide any mitigiations for downgrade or substitution attacks
   (see Section 1 of [RFC6211]) of the hashing algorithm.  To protect
   against such attacks, endpoints could restrict their set of supported
   algorithms to stronger ones and protect the fields value by using TLS
   and/or digital signatures.
6.7.  Resource exhaustion
   Integrity fields validation consumes computational resources.  In
   order to avoid resource exhaustion, implementations can restrict
   validation of the algorithm types, number of validations, or the size
   of content.
7.  IANA Considerations
7.1.  HTTP Field Name Registration
   IANA is asked to update the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field
   Name Registry" registry ([SEMANTICS]) according to the table below:
   +---------------------+-----------+---------------------------------+
   | Field Name          | Status    | Reference                       |
   +---------------------+-----------+---------------------------------+
   | Content-Digest      | permanent | Section 2 of this document      |
   | Repr-Digest         | permanent | Section 3 of this document      |
   | Want-Content-Digest | permanent | Section 4 of this document      |
   | Want-Repr-Digest    | permanent | Section 4 of this document      |
   | Digest              | obsoleted | [RFC3230], Section 1.3 of this  |
   |                     |           | document                        |
   | Want-Digest         | obsoleted | [RFC3230], Section 1.3 of this  |
   |                     |           | document                        |
   +---------------------+-----------+---------------------------------+
7.2.  Establish the Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields Registry
   This memo sets this specification to be the establishing document for
   the Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields [2] registry defined in
   Section 5.
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   IANA is asked to initialize the registry with the entries in Table 1.
8.  References
8.1.  Normative References
   [CMU-836068]
              Carnagie Mellon University, Software Engineering
              Institute, "MD5 Vulnerable to collision attacks", December
              2008, .
   [IACR-2020-014]
              Leurent, G. and T. Peyrin, "SHA-1 is a Shambles", January
              2020, .
   [NIST800-32]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
              Department of Commerce, "Introduction to Public Key
              Technology and the Federal PKI Infrastructure", February
              2001, .
   [RFC1321]  Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992,
              .
   [RFC1950]  Deutsch, P. and J-L. Gailly, "ZLIB Compressed Data Format
              Specification version 3.3", RFC 1950,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1950, May 1996,
              .
   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              .
   [RFC3174]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1
              (SHA1)", RFC 3174, DOI 10.17487/RFC3174, September 2001,
              .
   [RFC3230]  Mogul, J. and A. Van Hoff, "Instance Digests in HTTP",
              RFC 3230, DOI 10.17487/RFC3230, January 2002,
              .
   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
              .
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   [RFC4960]  Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
              RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007,
              .
   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
              .
   [RFC6234]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
              (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
              .
   [RFC7405]  Kyzivat, P., "Case-Sensitive String Support in ABNF",
              RFC 7405, DOI 10.17487/RFC7405, December 2014,
              .
   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              .
   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, .
   [SEMANTICS]
              Fielding, R. T., Nottingham, M., and J. Reschke, "HTTP
              Semantics", draft-ietf-httpbis-semantics-19 (work in
              progress), September 2021.
   [STRUCTURED-FIELDS]
              Nottingham, M. and P-H. Kamp, "Structured Field Values for
              HTTP", RFC 8941, DOI 10.17487/RFC8941, February 2021,
              .
   [UNIX]     The Open Group, "The Single UNIX Specification, Version 2
              - 6 Vol Set for UNIX 98", February 1997.
8.2.  Informative References
   [HTTP11]   Fielding, R. T., Nottingham, M., and J. Reschke,
              "HTTP/1.1", draft-ietf-httpbis-messaging-19 (work in
              progress), September 2021.
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   [I-D.thomson-http-mice]
              Thomson, M. and J. Yasskin, "Merkle Integrity Content
              Encoding", draft-thomson-http-mice-03 (work in progress),
              August 2018.
   [NO-MD5]   Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
              for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
              RFC 6151, DOI 10.17487/RFC6151, March 2011,
              .
   [NO-SHA]   Polk, T., Chen, L., Turner, S., and P. Hoffman, "Security
              Considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest
              Algorithms", RFC 6194, DOI 10.17487/RFC6194, March 2011,
              .
   [PATCH]    Dusseault, L. and J. Snell, "PATCH Method for HTTP",
              RFC 5789, DOI 10.17487/RFC5789, March 2010,
              .
   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
              .
   [RFC6211]  Schaad, J., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithm
              Identifier Protection Attribute", RFC 6211,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6211, April 2011,
              .
   [RFC7396]  Hoffman, P. and J. Snell, "JSON Merge Patch", RFC 7396,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7396, October 2014,
              .
   [RFC7696]  Housley, R., "Guidelines for Cryptographic Algorithm
              Agility and Selecting Mandatory-to-Implement Algorithms",
              BCP 201, RFC 7696, DOI 10.17487/RFC7696, November 2015,
              .
   [RFC7807]  Nottingham, M. and E. Wilde, "Problem Details for HTTP
              APIs", RFC 7807, DOI 10.17487/RFC7807, March 2016,
              .
   [SIGNATURES]
              Backman, A., Richer, J., and M. Sporny, "HTTP Message
              Signatures", draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-09
              (work in progress), March 2022.
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8.3.  URIs
   [1] https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-dig-alg/
   [2] https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-structured-dig-alg/
Appendix A.  Resource Representation and Representation Data
   The following examples show how representation metadata, payload
   transformations and method impacts on the message and content.  When
   the content contains non-printable characters (e.g. when it is
   compressed) it is shown as a Base64-encoded string.
   PUT /entries/1234 HTTP/1.1
   Host: foo.example
   Content-Type: application/json
   {"hello": "world"}
        Request containing a JSON object without any content coding
   PUT /entries/1234 HTTP/1.1
   Host: foo.example
   Content-Type: application/json
   Content-Encoding: gzip
   H4sIAItWyFwC/6tWSlSyUlAypANQqgUAREcqfG0AAAA=
               Request containing a gzip-encoded JSON object
   Now the same content conveys a malformed JSON object, because the
   request does not indicate a content coding.
   PUT /entries/1234 HTTP/1.1
   Host: foo.example
   Content-Type: application/json
   H4sIAItWyFwC/6tWSlSyUlAypANQqgUAREcqfG0AAAA=
                     Request containing malformed JSON
   A Range-Request alters the content, conveying a partial
   representation.
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   GET /entries/1234 HTTP/1.1
   Host: foo.example
   Range: bytes=1-7
                        Request for partial content
   HTTP/1.1 206 Partial Content
   Content-Encoding: gzip
   Content-Type: application/json
   Content-Range: bytes 1-7/18
   iwgAla3RXA==
            Partial response from a gzip-encoded representation
   The method can also alter the content.  For example, the response to
   a HEAD request does not carry content.
   HEAD /entries/1234 HTTP/1.1
   Host: foo.example
   Accept: application/json
   Accept-Encoding: gzip
                               HEAD request
   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Content-Type: application/json
   Content-Encoding: gzip
                 Response to HEAD request (empty content)
   Finally, the semantics of an HTTP response might decouple the
   effective request URI from the enclosed representation.  In the
   example response below, the "Content-Location" header field indicates
   that the enclosed representation refers to the resource available at
   "/authors/123", even though the request is directed to "/authors/".
   POST /authors/ HTTP/1.1
   Host: foo.example
   Accept: application/json
   Content-Type: application/json
   {"author": "Camilleri"}
                               POST request
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   HTTP/1.1 201 Created
   Content-Type: application/json
   Content-Location: /authors/123
   Location: /authors/123
   {"id": "123", "author": "Camilleri"}
                   Response with Content-Location header
Appendix B.  Examples of Unsolicited Digest
   The following examples demonstrate interactions where a server
   responds with a "Content-Digest" or "Repr-Digest" fields even though
   the client did not solicit one using "Want-Content-Digest" or "Want-
   Repr-Digest".
   Some examples include JSON objects in the content.  For presentation
   purposes, objects that fit completely within the line-length limits
   are presented on a single line using compact notation with no leading
   space.  Objects that would exceed line-length limits are presented
   across multiple lines (one line per key-value pair) with 2 spaced of
   leading indentation.
   Checksum mechanisms defined in this document are media-type agnostic
   and do not provide canonicalization algorithms for specific formats.
   Examples are calculated inclusive of any space.  While examples can
   include both fields, "Content-Digest" and "Repr-Digest" can be
   returned independently.
B.1.  Server Returns Full Representation Data
   In this example, the message content conveys complete representation
   data.  This means that in the response, "Content-Digest" and "Repr-
   Digest" are both computed over the JSON object "{"hello": "world"}",
   and thus have the same value.
   GET /items/123 HTTP/1.1
   Host: foo.example
                          GET request for an item
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   NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792
   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Content-Type: application/json
   Content-Digest: \
     sha-256=:X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=:
   Repr-Digest: \
     sha-256=:X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=:
   {"hello": "world"}
          Response with identical Repr-Digest and Content-Digest
B.2.  Server Returns No Representation Data
   In this example, a HEAD request is used to retrieve the checksum of a
   resource.
   The response "Content-Digest" field-value is computed on empty
   content.  "Repr-Digest" is calculated over the JSON object "{"hello":
   "world"}", which is not shown because there is no payload data.
   HEAD /items/123 HTTP/1.1
   Host: foo.example
                         HEAD request for an item
   NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792
   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Content-Type: application/json
   Content-Digest: \
     sha-256=:47DEQpj8HBSa+/TImW+5JCeuQeRkm5NMpJWZG3hSuFU=:
   Repr-Digest: \
     sha-256=:X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=:
        Response with both Content-Digest and Digest; empty content
B.3.  Server Returns Partial Representation Data
   In this example, the client makes a range request and the server
   responds with partial content.
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   GET /items/123 HTTP/1.1
   Host: foo.example
   Range: bytes=1-7
                        Request for partial content
   NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792
   HTTP/1.1 206 Partial Content
   Content-Type: application/json
   Content-Range: bytes 1-7/18
   Content-Digest: \
     sha-256=:Wqdirjg/u3J688ejbUlApbjECpiUUtIwT8lY/z81Tno=:
   Repr-Digest: \
     sha-256=:X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=:
   "hello"
         Partial response with both Content-Digest and Repr-Digest
   In the response message above, note that the "Repr-Digest" and
   "Content-Digests" are different.  The "Repr-Digest" field-value is
   calculated across the entire JSON object "{"hello": "world"}", and
   the field is
   Repr-Digest: sha-256=:X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=:
   However, since the message content is constrained to bytes 1-7, the
   "Content-Digest" field-value is calculated over the byte sequence
   ""hello"", thus resulting in
   NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792
   Content-Digest: \
     sha-256=:Wqdirjg/u3J688ejbUlApbjECpiUUtIwT8lY/z81Tno=:
B.4.  Client and Server Provide Full Representation Data
   The request contains a "Repr-Digest" field-value calculated on the
   enclosed representation.  It also includes an "Accept-Encoding: br"
   header field that advertises the client supports Brotli encoding.
   The response includes a "Content-Encoding: br" that indicates the
   selected representation is Brotli-encoded.  The "Repr-Digest" field-
   value is therefore different compared to the request.
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   For presentation purposes, the response body is displayed as a
   Base64-encoded string because it contains non-printable characters.
   PUT /items/123 HTTP/1.1
   Host: foo.example
   Content-Type: application/json
   Accept-Encoding: br
   Repr-Digest: sha-256=:X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=:
   {"hello": "world"}
                          PUT Request with Digest
   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Content-Type: application/json
   Content-Location: /items/123
   Content-Encoding: br
   Content-Length: 22
   Repr-Digest: sha-256=:4REjxQ4yrqUVicfSKYNO/cF9zNj5ANbzgDZt3/h3Qxo=:
   iwiAeyJoZWxsbyI6ICJ3b3JsZCJ9Aw==
                 Response with Digest of encoded response
B.5.  Client Provides Full Representation Data, Server Provides No
      Representation Data
   The request "Repr-Digest" field-value is calculated on the enclosed
   payload.
   The response "Repr-Digest" field-value depends on the representation
   metadata header fields, including "Content-Encoding: br" even when
   the response does not contain content.
   PUT /items/123 HTTP/1.1
   Host: foo.example
   Content-Type: application/json
   Content-Length: 18
   Accept-Encoding: br
   Repr-Digest: sha-256=:X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=:
   {"hello": "world"}
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   HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
   Content-Type: application/json
   Content-Encoding: br
   Repr-Digest: sha-256=:4REjxQ4yrqUVicfSKYNO/cF9zNj5ANbzgDZt3/h3Qxo=:
                        Empty response with Digest
B.6.  Client and Server Provide Full Representation Data
   The response contains two digest values using different algorithms.
   As the response body contains non-printable characters, it is
   displayed as a base64-encoded string.
   PUT /items/123 HTTP/1.1
   Host: foo.example
   Content-Type: application/json
   Accept-Encoding: br
   Repr-Digest: sha-256=:X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=:
   {"hello": "world"}
                          PUT Request with Digest
   NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792
   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Content-Type: application/json
   Content-Encoding: br
   Content-Location: /items/123
   Repr-Digest: \
     sha-256=:4REjxQ4yrqUVicfSKYNO/cF9zNj5ANbzgDZt3/h3Qxo=:,\
     sha-512=:pxo7aYzcGI88pnDnoSmAnaOEVys0MABhgvHY9+VI+ElE60jBCwnMPyA/\
     s3NF3ZO5oIWA7lf8ukk+5KJzm3p5og==:
   iwiAeyJoZWxsbyI6ICJ3b3JsZCJ9Aw==
                  Response with Digest of Encoded Content
B.7.  POST Response does not Reference the Request URI
   The request "Repr-Digest" field-value is computed on the enclosed
   representation (see Section 3.1).
   The representation enclosed in the response refers to the resource
   identified by "Content-Location" (see Section 6.4.2 of [SEMANTICS]).
   "Repr-Digest" is thus computed on the enclosed representation.
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   POST /books HTTP/1.1
   Host: foo.example
   Content-Type: application/json
   Accept: application/json
   Accept-Encoding: identity
   Repr-Digest: sha-256=:bWopGGNiZtbVgHsG+I4knzfEJpmmmQHf7RHDXA3o1hQ=:
   {"title": "New Title"}
                         POST Request with Digest
   HTTP/1.1 201 Created
   Content-Type: application/json
   Content-Location: /books/123
   Location: /books/123
   Repr-Digest: sha-256=:yxOAqEeoj+reqygSIsLpT0LhumrNkIds5uLKtmdLyYE=:
   {
     "id": "123",
     "title": "New Title"
   }
                     Response with Digest of Resource
   Note that a "204 No Content" response without content but with the
   same "Repr-Digest" field-value would have been legitimate too.  In
   that case, "Content-Digest" would have been computed on an empty
   content.
B.8.  POST Response Describes the Request Status
   The request "Repr-Digest" field-value is computed on the enclosed
   representation (see Section 3.1).
   The representation enclosed in the response describes the status of
   the request, so "Repr-Digest" is computed on that enclosed
   representation.
   Response "Repr-Digest" has no explicit relation with the resource
   referenced by "Location".
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   POST /books HTTP/1.1
   Host: foo.example
   Content-Type: application/json
   Accept: application/json
   Accept-Encoding: identity
   Repr-Digest: sha-256=:bWopGGNiZtbVgHsG+I4knzfEJpmmmQHf7RHDXA3o1hQ=:
   {"title": "New Title"}
                         POST Request with Digest
   HTTP/1.1 201 Created
   Content-Type: application/json
   Repr-Digest: sha-256=:2LBp5RKZGpsSNf8BPXlXrX4Td4Tf5R5bZ9z7kdi5VvY=:
   Location: /books/123
   {
     "status": "created",
     "id": "123",
     "ts": 1569327729,
     "instance": "/books/123"
   }
                  Response with Digest of Representation
B.9.  Digest with PATCH
   This case is analogous to a POST request where the target resource
   reflects the effective request URI.
   The PATCH request uses the "application/merge-patch+json" media type
   defined in [RFC7396].
   "Repr-Digest" is calculated on the enclosed payload, which
   corresponds to the patch document.
   The response "Repr-Digest" field-value is computed on the complete
   representation of the patched resource.
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   PATCH /books/123 HTTP/1.1
   Host: foo.example
   Content-Type: application/merge-patch+json
   Accept: application/json
   Accept-Encoding: identity
   Repr-Digest: sha-256=:bWopGGNiZtbVgHsG+I4knzfEJpmmmQHf7RHDXA3o1hQ=:
   {"title": "New Title"}
                    Figure 1: PATCH Request with Digest
   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Content-Type: application/json
   Repr-Digest: sha-256=:yxOAqEeoj+reqygSIsLpT0LhumrNkIds5uLKtmdLyYE=:
   {
     "id": "123",
     "title": "New Title"
   }
                  Response with Digest of Representation
   Note that a "204 No Content" response without content but with the
   same "Repr-Digest" field-value would have been legitimate too.
B.10.  Error responses
   In error responses, the representation data does not necessarily
   refer to the target resource.  Instead, it refers to the
   representation of the error.
   In the following example, a client sends the same request from
   Figure 1 to patch the resource located at /books/123.  However, the
   resource does not exist and the server generates a 404 response with
   a body that describes the error in accordance with [RFC7807].
   The response "Repr-Digest" field-value is computed on this enclosed
   representation.
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   HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
   Content-Type: application/problem+json
   Repr-Digest: sha-256=:KPqhVXAT25LLitV1w0O167unHmVQusu+fpxm65zAsvk=:
   {
     "title": "Not Found",
     "detail": "Cannot PATCH a non-existent resource",
     "status": 404
   }
               Response with Digest of Error Representation
B.11.  Use with Trailer Fields and Transfer Coding
   An origin server sends "Repr-Digest" as trailer field, so it can
   calculate digest-value while streaming content and thus mitigate
   resource consumption.  The "Repr-Digest" field-value is the same as
   in Appendix B.1 because "Repr-Digest" is designed to be independent
   from the use of one or more transfer codings (see Section 3).
   GET /items/123 HTTP/1.1
   Host: foo.example
                                GET Request
   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Content-Type: application/json
   Transfer-Encoding: chunked
   Trailer: Digest
   8\r\n
   {"hello"\r\n
   8
   : "world\r\n
   2\r\n
   "}\r\n
   0\r\n
   Repr-Digest: sha-256=:X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=:
                       Chunked Response with Digest
Appendix C.  Examples of Want-Repr-Digest Solicited Digest
   The following examples demonstrate interactions where a client
   solicits a "Repr-Digest" using "Want-Repr-Digest".  The behavior of
   "Content-Digest" and "Want-Content-Digest" is identical.
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   Some examples include JSON objects in the content.  For presentation
   purposes, objects that fit completely within the line-length limits
   are presented on a single line using compact notation with no leading
   space.  Objects that would exceed line-length limits are presented
   across multiple lines (one line per key-value pair) with 2 spaced of
   leading indentation.
   Checksum mechanisms described in this document are media-type
   agnostic and do not provide canonicalization algorithms for specific
   formats.  Examples are calculated inclusive of any space.
C.1.  Server Selects Client's Least Preferred Algorithm
   The client requests a digest, preferring "sha".  The server is free
   to reply with "sha-256" anyway.
   GET /items/123 HTTP/1.1
   Host: foo.example
   Want-Repr-Digest: sha-256=3, sha=10
                     GET Request with Want-Repr-Digest
   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Content-Type: application/json
   Repr-Digest: sha-256=:X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=:
   {"hello": "world"}
                     Response with Different Algorithm
C.2.  Server Selects Algorithm Unsupported by Client
   The client requests a "sha" digest because that is the only algorithm
   it supports.  The server is not obliged to produce a response
   containing a "sha" digest, it instead uses a different algorithm.
   GET /items/123 HTTP/1.1
   Host: foo.example
   Want-Repr-Digest: sha=10
                     GET Request with Want-Repr-Digest
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   NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792
   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Content-Type: application/json
   Repr-Digest: \
     sha-512=:WZDPaVn/7XgHaAy8pmojAkGWoRx2UFChF41A2svX+TaPm+AbwAgBWnrI\
     iYllu7BNNyealdVLvRwEmTHWXvJwew==:
   {"hello": "world"}
                    Response with Unsupported Algorithm
C.3.  Server Does Not Support Client Algorithm and Returns an Error
   Appendix C.2 is an example where a server ignores the client's
   preferred digest algorithm.  Alternatively a server can also reject
   the request and return an error.
   In this example, the client requests a "sha" "Repr-Digest", and the
   server returns an error with problem details [RFC7807] contained in
   the content.  The problem details contain a list of the hashing
   algorithms that the server supports.  This is purely an example, this
   specification does not define any format or requirements for such
   content.
   GET /items/123 HTTP/1.1
   Host: foo.example
   Want-Repr-Digest: sha=10
                     GET Request with Want-Repr-Digest
   HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
   Content-Type: application/problem+json
   {
     "title": "Bad Request",
     "detail": "Supported hashing algorithms: sha-256, sha-512",
     "status": 400
   }
               Response advertising the supported algorithms
Appendix D.  Migrating from RFC 3230
   HTTP digests are computed by applying a hashing algorithm to input
   data.  RFC 3230 defined the input data as an "instance", a term it
   also defined.  The concept of instance has since been superseded by
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   the HTTP semantic term "representation".  It is understood that some
   implementations of RFC 3230 mistook "instance" to mean HTTP content.
   Using content for the Digest field is an error that leads to
   interoperability problems between peers that implement RFC 3230.
   For the uncertainty of doubt, RFC 3230 was only ever intended to use
   what HTTP now defines as selected representation data.  The semantic
   concept of digest and representation are explained alongside the
   definition of Representation-Digest Section 3.
   While the syntax of Digest and Repr-Digest are different, the
   considerations and examples this document gives to Repr-Digest apply
   equally to Digest because they operate on the same input data.  See
   Section 3.1, Section 6 and Section 6.3.
   RFC 3230 could never communicate the digest of HTTP message content
   in the Digest field; Content-Digest now provides that capability.
Acknowledgements
   This document is based on ideas from [RFC3230], so thanks to J.
   Mogul and A.  Van Hoff for their great work.  The original idea of
   refreshing RFC3230 arose from an interesting discussion with M.
   Nottingham, J.  Yasskin and M.  Thomson when reviewing the MICE
   content coding.
   Thanks to Julian Reschke for his valuable contributions to this
   document, and to the following contributors that have helped improve
   this specification by reporting bugs, asking smart questions,
   drafting or reviewing text, and evaluating open issues: Mike Bishop,
   Brian Campbell, Matthew Kerwin, James Manger, Tommy Pauly, Sean
   Turner, Justin Richer, and Erik Wilde.
Code Samples
   _RFC Editor: Please remove this section before publication._
   How can I generate and validate the "Repr-Digest" values shown in the
   examples throughout this document?
   The following python3 code can be used to generate digests for JSON
   objects using SHA algorithms for a range of encodings.  Note that
   these are formatted as base64.  This function could be adapted to
   other algorithms and should take into account their specific
   formatting rules.
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   import base64, json, hashlib, brotli, logging
   log = logging.getLogger()
   def encode_item(item, encoding=lambda x: x):
       indent = 2 if isinstance(item, dict) and len(item) > 1 else None
       json_bytes = json.dumps(item, indent=indent).encode()
       return encoding(json_bytes)
   def digest_bytes(bytes_, algorithm=hashlib.sha256):
       checksum_bytes = algorithm(bytes_).digest()
       log.warning("Log bytes: \n[%r]", bytes_)
       return base64.encodebytes(checksum_bytes).strip()
   def digest(item, encoding=lambda x: x, algorithm=hashlib.sha256):
       content_encoded = encode_item(item, encoding)
       return digest_bytes(content_encoded, algorithm)
   item = {"hello": "world"}
   print("Encoding | hashing algorithm | digest-value")
   print("Identity | sha256 |", digest(item))
   # Encoding | hashing algorithm | digest-value
   # Identity | sha256 | X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=
   print("Encoding | hashing algorithm | digest-value")
   print("Brotli | sha256 |", digest(item, encoding=brotli.compress))
   # Encoding | hashing algorithm | digest-value
   # Brotli | sha256 | 4REjxQ4yrqUVicfSKYNO/cF9zNj5ANbzgDZt3/h3Qxo=
   print("Encoding | hashing algorithm | digest-value")
   print("Identity | sha512 |", digest(item, algorithm=hashlib.sha512))
   print("Brotli | sha512 |", digest(item, algorithm=hashlib.sha512,
                                       encoding=brotli.compress))
   # Encoding | hashing algorithm | digest-value
   # Identity | sha512 |b'WZDPaVn/7XgHaAy8pmojAkGWoRx2UFChF41A2svX+TaPm'
   #                     '+AbwAgBWnrIiYllu7BNNyealdVLvRwEmTHWXvJwew=='
   # Brotli | sha512 | b'pxo7aYzcGI88pnDnoSmAnaOEVys0MABhgvHY9+VI+ElE6'
   #                   '0jBCwnMPyA/s3NF3ZO5oIWA7lf8ukk+5KJzm3p5og=='
Changes
   _RFC Editor: Please remove this section before publication._
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G.1.  Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-08
   o  Add note about migrating from RFC 3230. #1968, #1971
   o  Clarify what Want-* means in responses. #2097
   o  Editorial changes to structure and to align to HTTP style guide.
G.2.  Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-07
   o  Introduced Repr-Digest and Want-Repr-Digest, and deprecated Digest
      and Want-Digest.  Use of Structured Fields. #1993, #1919
   o  IANA refactoring. #1983
   o  No normative text in security considerations. #1972
G.3.  Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-06
   o  Remove id-sha-256 and id-sha-512 from the list of supported
      algorithms #855
G.4.  Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-05
   o  Reboot digest-algorithm values registry #1567
   o  Add Content-Digest #1542
   o  Remove SRI section #1478
G.5.  Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-04
   o  Improve SRI section #1354
   o  About duplicate digest-algorithms #1221
   o  Improve security considerations #852
   o  md5 and sha deprecation references #1392
   o  Obsolete 3230 #1395
   o  Editorial #1362
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G.6.  Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-03
   o  Reference semantics-12
   o  Detail encryption quirks
   o  Details on Algorithm agility #1250
   o  Obsolete parameters #850
G.7.  Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-02
   o  Deprecate SHA-1 #1154
   o  Avoid id-* with encrypted content
   o  Digest is independent from MESSAGING and HTTP/1.1 is not normative
      #1215
   o  Identity is not a valid field value for content-encoding #1223
   o  Mention trailers #1157
   o  Reference httpbis-semantics #1156
   o  Add contentMD5 as an obsoleted digest-algorithm #1249
   o  Use lowercase digest-algorithms names in the doc and in the
      digest-algorithm IANA table.
G.8.  Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-01
   o  Digest of error responses is computed on the error representation-
      data #1004
   o  Effect of HTTP semantics on payload and message body moved to
      appendix #1122
   o  Editorial refactoring, moving headers sections up. #1109-#1112,
      #1116, #1117, #1122-#1124
G.9.  Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-00
   o  Align title with document name
   o  Add id-sha-* algorithm examples #880
   o  Reference [RFC6234] and [RFC3174] instead of FIPS-1
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   o  Deprecate MD5
   o  Obsolete ADLER-32 but don't forbid it #828
   o  Update CRC32C value in IANA table #828
   o  Use when acting on resources (POST, PATCH) #853
   o  Added Relationship with SRI, draft Use Cases #868, #971
   o  Warn about the implications of "Content-Location"
Authors' Addresses
   Roberto Polli
   Team Digitale, Italian Government
   Italy
   Email: robipolli@gmail.com
   Lucas Pardue
   Cloudflare
   Email: lucaspardue.24.7@gmail.com
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